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THE PSYCHIATRIST, THE SOCIOPATH AND
THE COURTS: NEW LINES FOR
AN OLD BATTLE
By
Gerald F Uelmen*
All we psychiatrists can tell the law is that if you think you
have trouble with our inconsistencies now, wait and see what
the future holds.'
If we were going to see a psychiatrist, I am sure he would not
let us bring our own couches along. When the psychiatrists
come over to see us officially and testify, there is no valid rea-
son I can see that they should not do business on our terms
2
I. INTRODUCTION
The final approval of the third edition of the Diagnostic and Statis-
tica!Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM-III) by the American Psychiat-
ric Association in June of 1979 marked the beginning of a dramatic
new chapter in the history of the American psychiatric profession.'
DSM-III became available in final published form in February of 1980,
and it is now common to see psychiatrists with their noses in the little
yellow book,4 checking to see what new labels have been devised for
the symptoms their patients exhibit. DSM-III is a response to increas-
ing criticism of the great divergence in psychiatric diagnosis, whereby
* Professor of Law, Loyola Law School, Los Angeles, California. The author wishes
to acknowledge the editorial assistance of Douglas Smith, Loyola Law School, and the aid
of the Loyola Law School Summer Grant program for the support of faculty research. Val-
uable insights, suggestions, and criticism were offered by Michael Coburn, M.D., Victor
Haddox, M.D., J.D., Professor Frederick J. Lower, Jr., J.D., Seymour Pollack, M.D., and
Jean Uelmen, Ph.D., who reviewed an initial draft of this article.
1. Diamond, From M'Naghten to Currens, and Beyond, 50 CALIF. L. REV. 189, 197
(1962) [hereinafter cited as Diamond].
2. Wade v. United States, 426 F.2d 64, 86 (9th Cir. 1970) (en bane) (Chambers, J.,
dissenting).
3. AMERICAN PSYCHIATRIC ASS'N, DIAGNOSTICI AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF
MENTAL DISORDERS (3d ed. 1980) [hereinafter cited as DSM-III].
4. The diagnostic criteria of DSM-III have been published in quick reference form in a
paperback pocket size edition, hereinafter referred to as the "little yellow book." DSM-III
itself is big, blue, and hardbound.
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the same patient being examined by two different psychiatrists might
be labeled with two completely different mental disorders.' DSM-III
seeks to remedy this great divergence by specifying very detailed "diag-
nostic criteria" that must be satisfied before a diagnosis can be made.
The array of diagnoses available has also been expanded considerably.
DSM-III has 235 independent categories of mental disorders in com-
parison to 158 in its second edition (DSM-II).6 Preliminary testing has
shown a substantial increase in the reliability of diagnosis with DSM-
III criteria,7 but the real test is yet to come.
The diagnostic labels used by psychiatrists are encountered in a
variety of legal settings, and the impact of DSM-III will be felt for
years to come by specialists in workers' compensation, tort recovery,
and proceedings for compulsory commitment and guardianship. The
most immediate impact of DSM-III, however, is already reverberating
through the criminal arena. The availability of the insanity defense has
been vastly expanded by two decisions of the California Supreme
Court in the past three years.' The parade of psychiatrists marching
into the courtrooms to testify is thus growing, and every one of them is
carrying the little yellow book in his briefcase or pocket.
This article will not attempt to assess all of the new diagnostic la-
bels introduced by DSM-III or how these labels fit into our legal con-
ceptions of insanity.9 It will explore the implications of only one
category of mental disorder, the "antisocial personality disorder," more
commonly known as the "sociopath" or "psychopath."' 0 For the past
thirty years, the definition of the term "sociopath" has been the princi-
5. One early study reported an overall rate of agreement of diagnoses by different psy-
chiatrists to be as low as 17%. Clausen & Kohn, Schizophrenia and the Social Structure, in
EPIDEMIOLOGY OF MENTAL DISORDER 69 (Pasamanick ed. 1959). See also Beck, Reliability
of Psychiatric Diagnosis: 4 Study of Consistency of Clinical Judgments and Ratings, 119 AM.
J. PSYCH. 351 (1962); Frank, Psychiatric Diagnosis.- .4 Review of Research, 81 J. GEN. PsYcH.
157 (1969).
6. AMERICAN PSYCHIATRIC ASS'N, DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF
MENTAL DISORDERS (2d ed. 1968) [hereinafter cited as DSM-IIJ.
7. Spitzer, DSM-III Field Trials, 136 AM. J. PSYCH. 815, 818 (1979).
8. People v. Drew, 22 Cal. 3d 333, 583 P.2d 1318, 149 Cal. Rptr. 275 (1978), adopted
the American Law Institute (ALI) test of insanity. In re Moye, 22 Cal. 3d 457, 584 P.2d
1097, 149 Cal. Rptr. 49 (1978), limited the automatic commitment following an insanity
acquittal to the maximum sentence prescribed for the underlying offense, removing the dis-
incentive to raise the insanity defense where minor offenses are charged.
9. Dr. Seymour Pollack has done a masterful job of that. See S. Pollack, ALI Insanity
in The Insanity Defense 16-70 (Feb. 6, 1980) (unpublished manual by U.S.C. Institute of
Psychiatry, Law and Behavioral Science) [hereinafter cited as Pollack].
10. The terms "sociopath" and "psychopath" are used interchangeably in psychiatric
literature.
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pal battleground upon which the psychiatric conception of mental dis-
ease has differed from the legal conception. Another battle is about to
be fought in the California Supreme Court.1'
When the California Supreme Court abandoned the M'Naghten
definition' 2 of insanity in 1978, and adopted the test proposed by the
American Law Institute (ALI), the court deferred "to a later occasion"
the question of whether subpart 2 of the test should be adopted. 13 Sub-
part 2, known as the "caveat" clause, purports to exclude sociopathy
from inclusion as a "mental disease or defect.""' This article will out-
line the reasons why a diagnosis of antisocial personality which relies
solely upon the diagnostic criteria of DSM-III should not qualify as a
"mental disease" under the California test of insanity in criminal cases.
In order to accomplish this, the California Supreme Court should
adopt the "caveat" clause as a rule governing the admission of evi-
dence, rather than as a substantive standard for the jury to apply.
II. PSYCHIATRIC DISAGREEMENT
The American Psychiatric Association first classified the "soci-
opathic personality disturbance" as a mental disorder in the first edi-
tion of the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual (DSM-I) in 1952.1
Describing the sociopath as "ill primarily in terms of society and con-
formity with the prevailing cultural milieu,"' 6 the diagnosis was differ-
entiated into four separate categories:
(1) The "antisocial reaction" which pertained to:
chronically antisocial individuals who are always in trouble,
profiting neither from experience nor punishment, and main-
taining no real loyalties to any person, group or code. They
are frequently callous and hedonistic, showing marked emo-
tional immaturity, with lack of sense of responsibility, lack of
judgment, and an ability to rationalize their behavior so that
11. People v. Fields, Case No. CR-21126. Fields is an automatic direct appeal from
imposition of a sentence of death. In People v. Martin, 114 Cal. App. 3d 739, 170 Cal. Rptr.
840 (4th Dist. 1981), the California Court of Appeal for the Fourth District affirmed a con-
viction where the jury was instructed in the language of subpart 2 of the ALI test.
12. The M'Naghten definition is derived from M'Naghten's Case, 8 Eng. Rptr. 718 (H.L.
1843).
13. People v. Drew, 22 Cal. 3d 333, 345 n.8, 583 P.2d 1318, 1324 n.8, 149 Cal. Rptr. 275,
281 n.8 (1978).
14. Id
15. AMERICAN PSYCHIATRIC ASS'N, DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF
MENTAL DISORDERS 38 (Ist ed. 1952) [hereinafter cited as DSM-I].
16. Id
1980]
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it appears warranted, reasonable, and justified. 7
(2) The "dyssocial reaction" which applied to:
individuals who manifest disregard for the usual social codes,
and often come in conflict with them, as the result of having
lived all their lives in an abnormal moral environment. They
may be capable of strong loyalties. These individuals typi-
cally do not show significant personality deviations other than
those implied by adherence to the values or code of their own
predatory, criminal, or other social group.'
(3) The "sexual deviation" which included deviant sexuality not
symptomatic of more serious mental illness. Examples included homo-
sexuality, transvestism and sexual sadism.' 9
(4) The "addiction to alcohol or drugs."
'20
The breadth of these four categories was widely criticized because
only the first category described the "antisocial personality" dealt with
in psychiatric literature .2 As a result, when DSM-II was published in
1968, the use of the term "reaction" was dropped, and the term "anti-
social personality" was reserved for individuals described, in language
strikingly similar to that used for the "antisocial reaction" in DSM-I.
There was, however, one significant addition:
[Ijndividuals who are basically unsocialized and whose be-
havior pattern brings them repeatedly into conflict with soci-
ety. They are incapable of significant loyalty to individuals,
groups, or social values. They are grossly selfish, callous, irre-
sponsible, impulsive, and unable to feel guilt or to learn from
experience and punishment. Frustration tolerance is low.
They tend to blame others or offer plausible rationalizations
for their behavior. A mere history of repeated legal or social
offenses is not sufficient to justify this diagnosis*22
The last sentence was significant for two reasons. First, it re-
sponded directly to the "caveat" clause of the ALI test of insanity,
which purported to exclude the sociopath by providing that the terms
"mental disease or defect" do not include "an abnormality manifested
only by repeated criminal or otherwise anti-social conduct. '23 Sec-
17. Id
18. Id
19. Id at 38-39.
20. Id. at 39.
21. H. CLECKLEY, THE MASK OF SANn'Y 270-71 (3d ed. 1955); L. ROBINS, DEVIANT
CHILDREN GROWN Up 79 (1966) [hereinafter cited as ROBINS].
22. DSM-II, supra note 6, at 43 (emphasis added).
23. MODEL PENAL CODE § 4.01(2), Comment (Tent. Draft No. 4, 1955).
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ondly, it sought to settle a profound disagreement within the psychiat-
ric profession about how a diagnosis of sociopathic personality should
be made. When one penetrates this disagreement, it becomes clear that
the term "psychopath" or "sociopath" means very different things to
different psychiatrists. Two schools of thought have emerged. The so-
called "psychodynamic" school views the disorder as a manifestation of
serious underlying disturbances in one's emotional life. These distur-
bances are similar to the more serious symptoms of psychosis, and
would most certainly be revealed in a penetrating psychiatric examina-
tion of the patient. The leading exponent of this school was Dr. Harvey
Cleckley, from whose work much of the description in DSM-I and
DSM-11 was apparently drawn. 4 Dr. Cleckley regarded the sociopath
as a true clinical entity, with a pattern of symptoms as discernible as
any psychosis, including "grave disturbances in the patient's affective
life as well as in foresight and the control and organization of behav-
ior." 5 Two other psychiatrists who shared the Cleckley view of the
sociopath were Dr. Winfred Overholser,26 who was Superintendent of
St. Elizabeth's Hospital in the District of Columbia, and Dr. Bernard L.
Diamond,27 a prolific lecturer and author on the interaction of law and
psychiatry.28
Another view is expounded by the so-called "social history"
school. This school takes the position that an examination of the pa-
tient is unnecessary to diagnose a sociopath. The only thing needed is
24. Cleckley's influence was described in United States v. Currens, 290 F.2d 751, 762 (3d
Cir. 1961).
25. Id (quoting R. WHITE, THE ABNORMAL PERSONALITY 404 (1948)).
26. In Overholser, Criminal Responsibility. A Psychiatrist's Viewpoint, 48 A.B.A.J. 527,
529 (1962) [hereinafter cited as Overholser], Dr. Overholser concluded that "[t]he sociopath
is characterized by lack of aim and of foresight, the failure to profit by experience, impul-
siveness, egocentricity, a lack of emotional rapport with others, a lack of sympathy, a general
immaturity and very little regulatory influence of intellect upon his behavior."
27. Diamond, supra note I, at 198.
[Miany of these unfortunate individuals are suffering from an organic, neuro-phys-
iological disease of the brain, which completely dominates their behavior. Their
appearance of normalcy, their apparent ability to exercise free will, choice, and
decision (and somehow invariably choose the wrong instead of the right) is purely
a facade, an artifact that conceals the extent to which they are victims of their own
brain pathology.
Id. See also Diamond, Identpication and the Sociopathic Personality, in ARCHIVES OF CRIM-
INAL PSYCHODYNAMICS 456-65 (1961).
28. E.g., Platt & Diamond, The Origins of the 'Tight and Wrong" Test of Criminal Re-
sponsibility and Its Subsequent Development in the United States: An Historical Survey, 54
CALIF. L. REV. 1227 (1966); Diamond, Criminal Responsibility of the Mentally 111, 14 STAN.
L. REV. 59 (1961); Diamond, The Scientific Method and the Law, 19 HASTINGS L.J. 179
(1967); Diamond, The Children of Leviathan: Psychoanalytic Speculations Concerning Wel-
fare Law and Punitive Sanctions, 54 CALIF. L. REV. 357 (1966).
1980]
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his FBI "rap sheet" or a similar compilation of his social history. This
view appears to proceed deductively, on the basis of an assumption that
one would not engage in repeated antisocial behavior unless he had an
underlying personality disorientation. But no attempt is made to iso-
late or describe that disorientation. Thus, a psychiatric examination is
necessary only to exclude the possibility of some other psychiatric con-
dition being present. A leading textbook following this school of
thought instructs the psychiatrist that "[s]ince there are no strong and
clear-cut diagnostic criteria, the diagnosis has to be made retrospec-
tively on the basis of a long history of psychopathic behavior."2 9 An-
other psychiatrist from this school advises:
The diagnosis of psychopathy is not made by examina-
tion but by a review of the life history. Examination shows
nothing. The life history shows a record of trouble, of shift-
lessness, of nomadism, of dishonesty, of nonconformity, of
mischief or of some similar trait. When this is the history in a
[person] of good intelligence and obvious sanity, one has the
right to suspect psychopathy. 0
Thus, as one commentator who extensively reviewed the literature has
concluded, under this view "a psychiatrist is not needed to diagnose
psychopathy. The policeman or the file clerk keeping criminal records
could fully measure up to the task."
'3 1
The formulation of the definition of anti-social personality in
DSM-II did not settle the disagreement between these two schools.
Simply stating that a mere history of repeated social offenses is not
enough to justify a diagnosis of anti-social personality does not indicate
what else is required. The only additional thing needed may be an
examination to exclude the possibility of another, more serious illness.
That was precisely the position taken in a treatise published in 1976,
that described the three essential conditions for a diagnosis of antisocial
personality as: (1) "the disorder should begin before the age of 15"; (2)
"the clinical picture should be of antisocial behavior involving multiple
areas of social functioning"; and (3) "there should be no other psychiat-
ric illness that could explain the symptoms. ' '3 2 Thus, it was left to
DSM-III to settle the argument.
29. E. STRECKER, FUNDAMENTALS OF PSYCHIATRY 182 (5th ed. 1952). See also J.
EWALT, E. STRECKER & F. EBAUGH, PRACTICAL CLINICAL PSYCHIATRY 258 (8th ed. 1957).
30. Davidson, How Trustworthy is the Witness? 2 J. FORENSIC MED. 14, 18 (1955).
31. Hakeem, .4 Critique of the Psychiatric Approach to Crime and Correction, 23 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROB. 650, 674 (1958).
32. A. FREEDMAN, H. KAPLAN & B. SADOCK, MODERN SYNOPSIS OF COMPREHENSIVE
TEXTBOOK OF PSYCHIATRY II 650 (1976).
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III. THE DSM-III CRITERIA
The DSM-III definition of the antisocial personality disorder rep-
resents a triumph of the "social history" school. The disorder is de-
fined only in terms of a laundry list of antisocial behavior, with no
attempt to describe any underlying disturbances that could be revealed
in an examination of the patient. While somewhat more detail is re-
quired than would be found in an FBI rap sheet, it is clear that any
clerk equipped with some kind of a social history of the patient could
make the diagnosis. An examination of the patient is required only to
exclude the possibility of severe mental retardation, schizophrenia or
manic episodes. The criteria are listed below:
A. Current age at least 18.
B. Onset before age 15 as indicated by a history of three or
more of the following before that age:
(1) truancy (positive if it amounted to at least five
days per year for at least two years, not including the
last year of school)
(2) expulsion or suspension from school for misbe-
havior
(3) delinquency (arrested or referred to juvenile court
because of behavior)
(4) running away from home overnight at least twice
while living in parental or parental surrogate home
(5) persistent lying
(6) repeated sexual intercourse in a casual relation-
ship
(7) repeated drunkenness or substance abuse
(8) thefts
(9) vandalism
(10) school grades markedly below expectations in re-
lation to estimated or known IQ (may have resulted in
repeating a year)
(11) chronic violations of rules at home and/or at
school (other than truancy)
(12) initiation of fights
C. At least four of the following manifestations of the disor-
der since age 18:
(1) inability to sustain consistent work behavior, as in-
dicated by any of the following: (a) too frequent job
changes (e.g., three or more jobs in five years not ac-
counted for by nature of job or economic or seasonal
1980]
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fluctuation), (b) significant unemployment (e.g., six
months or more in five years when expected to work),
(c) serious absenteeism from work (e.g., average three
days or more of lateness or absence per month), (d)
walking off several jobs without other jobs in sight
(Note: similar behavior in an academic setting during
the last few years of school may substitute for this crite-
rion in individuals who by reason of their age or cir-
cumstances have not had an opportunity to demonstrate
occupational adjustment)
(2) lack of ability to function as a responsible parent
as evidenced by one or more of the following: (a)
child's malnutrition, (b) child's illness resulting from
lack of minimal hygiene standards, (c) failure to obtain
medical care for a seriously ill child, (d) child's depen-
dence on neighbors or nonresident relatives for food or
shelter, (e) failure to arrange for a caretaker for a child
under six when parent is away from home, (f) repeated
squandering, on personal items, of money required for
household necessities
(3) failure to accept social norms with respect to law-
ful behavior, as indicated by any of the following: re-
peated thefts, illegal occupation (pimping, prostitution,
fencing, selling drugs), multiple arrests, a felony convic-
tion
(4) inability to maintain enduring attachment to a sex-
ual partner as indicated by two or more divorces and/or
separations (whether legally married or not), desertion
of spouse, promiscuity (ten or more sexual partners
within one year)
(5) irritability and aggressiveness as indicated by re-
peated physical fights or assault (not required by one's
job or to defend someone or oneself), including spouse
or child beating
(6) failure to honor financial obligations, as indicated
by repeated defaulting on debts, failure to provide child
support, failure to support other dependents on a regu-
lar basis
(7) failure to plan ahead, or impulsivity, as indicated
by traveling from place to place without a prearranged
job or clear goal for the period of travel or clear idea
[Vol. 14
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about when the travel would terminate, or lack of a
fixed address for a month or more
(8) disregard for the truth as indicated by repeated ly-
ing, use of aliases, "conning" others for personal profit
(9) recklessness, as indicated by driving while intoxi-
cated or recurrent speeding
D. A pattern of continuous antisocial behavior in which the
rights of others are violated, with no intervening period of at
least five years without antisocial behavior between age 15
and the present time (except when the individual was bedrid-
den or confined in a hospital or penal institution).
E. Antisocial behavior is not due to either severe mental re-
tardation, schizophrenia or manic episodes. 3
While DSM-III provides no official history of the source of these
criteria, a comparative table of DSM-II and DSM-III categories does
cryptically note that "[t]he DSM-III description and criteria are based
on longitudinal studies of children whose antisocial behavior persisted
into adult life."34 The only such study cited is Deviant Children Grown
Up by Dr. Lee N. Robins.35 Dr. Robins' study is a classic experiment
that was conducted over a thirty-year period. It recorded the life
course of 500 patients brought to a mental health clinic as children and
compared their performance with a sample of "normal" children from
the same neighborhoods. All of the patients were diagnosed by at least
two psychiatrists, who were able to agree on a specific diagnosis in 62%
of the cases.36 While detailed criteria bearing a strong resemblance to
those found in DSM-111 37 were devised, the criteria were not "auto-
matic" in the sense that a diagnosis was required if a minimum number
33. DSM-III, supra note 3, at 320-21.
34. Id at 379.
35. ROBINS, supra note 21.
36. Id at 74-76.
37. Id at 342 app. D. A minimum of five of the following nineteen criteria were re-
quired. Of those diagnosed as sociopathic personality in the Robins' study, the median
number of criteria met was eleven. Just six percent had symptoms only in the minimum five
areas. Id at 80.
Criteria for the Diagnosis of
Sociopathic Personality
A. POOR WORK HISTORY-at least six of the following: 6+ jobs within ten years,
successive jobs at less pay or less prestige, fired for incompetence or personal-
ity conflict, unemployment for more than a month at a time, quitting because
of fights or arguments, much time out for illness, chronic absenteeism, job
troubles from drinking, no jobs of as much as three years' duration in the last
ten years.
B. POOR MARITAL HISTORY-tWO or more divorces, marriage to wife with severe
behavior problems, repeated separations.
19801
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were met. The diagnostic process, however, was accomplished without
any examination of the patients by the psychiatrist. A standardized
"life history interview" was conducted, although not for all patients,
and not necessarily by the diagnosing psychiatrist. The process of diag-
nosis was described as follows:
All diagnoses were overall clinical judgments. While the col-
lection of social and psychiatric history in interview was sys-
tematic in the sense that every question was to be asked of
C. EXCESSIVE DRUGS-addiction to barbiturates, bromides, morphine, benze-
drine, or dexedrine, or a period of experimentation with drugs for non-medi-
cal purposes.
D. HEAVY DRINKING-medical complications, arrests, firing, serious family com-
plaints due to alcohol, or chronic intake of 3+ drinks at least three times a
week or seven drinks per'sitting.
E. REPEATED ARRESTS-three or more non-traffic arrests.
F. PHYSICAL AGGREsSION-arrest record for fighting, reports of wife or child
beatings, self-report of many fights.
G. SEXUAL PROMISCUITY OR PERVERSION-arrests on charges pertaining to sex,
interview claims of extreme promiscuity (e.g. 50 different sexual partners),
interview reports of homosexuality.
H. SUICIDE (ATrEMPTS)-death by suicide, police record, hospital, or interview
reports of suicide attempts.
I. IMPULSIVE BEHAVIOR-frequent moving from one city to another, more than
one elopement, sudden army enlistment, unprovoked desertion of home.
J. SCHOOL PROBLEMS AND TRUANCY-four or more of the following plus
repeated truancy: did not leave school at graduation point, two years older
than average in the last year at school, attended four or more grammar
schools, left school voluntarily before completing expected level, failed one
full year or more, complaints re discipline from teachers, fights with students,
expulsion or suspension.
K. PUBLIC FINANCIAL CARE-totally or partially supported by relatives, friends,
social agencies, or public institutions.
L. POOR ARMED SERVICES RECORt---enlistment of less thah one year's duration,
demotions, repeated AWOL, court-martial, punishments, desertion, dishonor-
able discharge.
M. VAGRANCY-period of several months or more of travel around the country
without prearranged employment.
N. MANY SOMATIC SYMPTOMS-at least ten somatic symptoms scored from
interview on medical-psychiatric inventory or fewer if severe or disabling.
0. PATHOLOGICAL LYING-fantastic history given which does not apparently
serve the function of omitting or white-washing reports of antisocial behavior.
P. LACK OF FRIENDS-does not participate in activities of any informal social
group, sees friends less than once in two weeks, has no or only one close
friend, sees less than ten people socially.
Q. USE OF ALIASES-interview report or police record showing use of an
assumed name.
R. LACK OF GUILT ABOUT SEXUAL EXPLOITS AND CRIMES-interviewer's
impression from the way in which patient reports his history.
S. REqFKLESS YOUTH-age span of 18 to 20 years reported as characterized by
seven or more of these: feeling carefree, leisure time spent almost entirely in
social activity, little time spent at home, self-report as reckless or wild, drove
fast, fought, drank excessively, changed jobs frequently, spent money extrava-
gantly.
Id at 342 app. D.
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every subject, no automatic diagnosis on the basis of the pres-
ence or absence of a given symptom or set of symptoms was
used.38
In other words, a subjective judgment was made, but it is clear that
this judgment was based simply on the evaluation of the patient's social
history, and not on any insight gained by probing the recesses of the
patient's mind. It is interesting to note that one subjective feature,
which many experts of the "psychodynamic" school describe as an es-
sential feature of the disease, the lack of guilt, was reported for only
40% of those diagnosed as sociopaths. The explanation given was:
The relatively low rate of lack of guilt results from the fact
that evidence for it could be determined only for personally
interviewed subjects, and only for them on the basis of the
interviewer's overall impressions. Interviewers did not ask
subjects whether they felt guilty about the antisocial acts to
which they admitted, for fear of endangering the subjects' co-
operation by making them feel that the interviewer con-
demned their behavior. For these reasons, lack of guilt,
which many authors feel to be the primary feature of the dis-
ease, was especially difficult to establish in any reliable fash-
ion.
39
It is even more interesting to note that lack of guilt is one of the few
criteria used by Dr. Robins which does not appear in the DSM-III
formula.
In fairness to DSM-III, it should be noted that the criteria they list
are not "automatic" either. Many, if not most, psychiatrists will ap-
proach the list as a bare minimum which, once met, requires a subjec-
tive judgment. But that is precisely the problem. What is being
judged? The patient's mental state, as revealed by a probing examina-
tion? Or the patient's social history, as revealed by his rap sheet?
DSM-III offers no clues, so the answer will probably depend upon
what "school" the psychiatrist subscribes to.40 This may explain why,
despite the specificity of the criteria, a low rate of interrator reliability
was reported for antisocial personality disorder in the DSM-III field
38. Id at 78.
39. Id at 81 (footnote omitted).
40. One explanation for the high rate of agreement of diagnosis in the Robins' study was
that a few psychiatrists were making all the diagnoses, and they had all been trained or were
training other psychiatrists in a single department of psychiatry "which has an unusual de-
gree of interest in differential diagnosis based on natural history findings." Id at 78.
1980]
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trials.4 ' The bottom line is that DSM-III offers no description of the
"disease" of antisocial personality disorder; only a laundry list of man-
ifestations of antisocial conduct is presented. To that extent, it is a step
backwards from DSM-II and does not even repeat the "mere history"
warning of DSM-II. While this laundry list may be sufficient for a re-
search project, it will hardly suffice when the diagnosis has great conse-
quences for the patient and the public.
IV. THE SOCIOPATH UNDER DURHAM
Under the traditional M'Naghten test of insanity, a diagnosis that
the defendant was a sociopath ordinarily had little consequence. Crim-
inal responsibility was defined in terms of the defendant's knowledge of
the nature and quality of his act and its wrongfulness.42 The capacity
of even the most severe sociopath to meet this test was practically as-
sumed because he certainly knew what he was doing and knew that it
was wrong. What he lacked was the kind of control over his behavior
that is ordinarily called a "conscience." The sociopath did not become
a problem for the law until more expansive legal conceptions of "in-
sanity" were adopted. The first major jurisdiction to take this leap was
the District of Columbia, and its grand experiment nearly ran aground
on the shoals of the sociopathic diagnosis. In Durham v. United
States,43 the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Colum-
bia defined criminal responsibility in terms of whether the unlawful
act "was the product of mental disease or defect. ' '44 No definition of
mental disease or defect was attempted, leaving that task in the hands
of the psychiatrists.
The new test appeared to make little difference until the psychia-
trists played their hand three years later. The bombshell exploded on
Monday, November 18, 1957, in a courtroom of the United States Dis-
trict Court for the District of Columbia, where the case of In re Rosen-
field45 was being heard. On the Friday before, the assistant
superintendent of St. Elizabeth's Hospital testified that the defendant
did not meet the Durham test of insanity, because he was not suffering
from a mental disease. On Monday morning he returned to the witness
stand and announced that he wanted to change his testimony, and of-
41. DSM-III, supra note 3, at 468.
42. M'Naghten's Case, 8 Eng. Rep. 718 (H.L. 1843).
43. 214 F.2d 862 (D.C. Cir. 1954). This case was subsequently overruled in United
States v. Brawner, 471 F.2d 969 (D.C. Cir. 1972). See text accompanying notes 77-84 infra.
44. 214 F.2d at 875.
45. 157 F. Supp. 18 (D.D.C. 1957).
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fered the opinion that the defendant was suffering from a mental dis-
ease. When the incredulous judge asked what had happened over the
weekend, he learned that the assistant superintendent's diagnosis had
not changed. On Monday, as on Friday, he labeled the defendant a
sociopath. But over the weekend, in a meeting with the superintendent
(Dr. Winfred Overholser) of the hospital, it had been agreed that
henceforth the hospital staff would consider the sociopathic personality
disorder as a "mental disease."4 6 While this was hardly the first time a
psychiatrist in the District of Columbia had testified that sociopathic
personality was a mental disease,47 this change had great impact be-
cause all court-ordered psychiatric examinations for the District of Co-
lumbia were handled by the staff of St. Elizabeth's Hospital. As a
result of this change of labels, a ten-fold increase in the number of
acquittals on the ground of insanity was reported.48
The District of Columbia Court of Appeals first responded to this
situation in 1962, with its decision in McDonald v. United States:4 9
Our eight-year experience under Durham suggests a judicial
definition, however broad and general, of what is included in
the terms "disease" and "defect." . . . Our purpose now is to
make clear that neither the court nor the jury is bound by ad
hoc definitions or conclusions as to what experts state is a dis-
ease or defect. What psychiatrists may consider a "mental
disease or defect" for clinical purposes, where their concern is
treatment, may or may not be the same as mental disease or
defect for the jury's purpose in determining criminal responsi-
bility. Consequently, for that purpose the jury should be told
that a mental disease or defect includes any abnormal condi-
tion of the mind which substantially affects mental or emo-
tional processes and substantially impairs behavior controls.5 0
Since McDonald was not a sociopath, however, it was left to another
case to explain how the sociopath fits into this definition.
That opportunity quickly presented itself in the incredible case of
Williams v. United States." Dallas Williams had a record of ten con-
46. The "weekend flip flop case" is described and discussed in United States v. Brawner,
471 F.2d 969, 978 (D.C. Cir. 1972), and Blocker v. United States, 288 F.2d 853, 860 (D.C.
Cir. 1961).
47. See Taylor v. United States, 222 F.2d 398, 404 (D.C. Cir. 1955); Stewart v. United
States, 214 F.2d 879, 881 (D.C. Cir. 1954).
48. Diamond, supra note 1, at 192 & n.19.
49. 312 F.2d 847 (D.C. Cir. 1962).
50. Id at 850-51.
51. 312 F.2d 862 (D.C. Cir. 1962).
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victions for crimes of violence by the time he was thirty-four years
old,52 when he was charged with an assault with a deadly weapon. He
was tried five times on this charge over a period of seven years. Two
trials ended in mistrials, and three ended in convictions that were re-
versed on appeal. While free on bail pending these trials, he was con-
victed of two more misdemeanor gun charges.53 The final reversal
precluded a retrial,54 so the government sought to civilly commit him.55
The petition for civil commitment was held insufficient because it did
not allege he was mentally ill.5 6 The examining psychiatrist found "no
evidence of psychotic thinking today," although he ominously warned
that "once [Williams] is released, he is likely to repeat his patterns of
criminal behavior, including homicide." 57 Williams was released, and
within two weeks was back in court charged with intoxication. This
time the judge found him not guilty by reason of insanity, and ordered
him committed to St. Elizabeth's Hospital for treatment. That commit-
ment was held invalid for insufficiency of evidence, and once again
Williams was released, with the court suggesting that the prosecution
try for a civil commitment again. 8 Two years later, all of the dire pre-
dictions were fulfilled when Williams shot and killed two men. At his
trial on the murder charges, he relied on the defense of insanity as de-
fined in Durham." A total of eleven psychiatrists testified. Five of
them concluded that the defendant was not suffering from any mental
disease, while another five psychiatrists described his condition as a
sociopathic personality. The eleventh psychiatrist diagnosed Williams
as schizophrenic. Williams was convicted, and on appeal urged that
the prosecution had failed to meet its burden of proving his sanity be-
yond a reasonable doubt. Although the court affirmed his conviction, it
did so not on the ground that sociopathic personality disturbance does
not meet the McDonald test of insanity. Instead, it held as follows:
[I]t is clear beyond cavil that appellant's sanity was a legiti-
mate issue in the case. Indeed, five psychiatrists testified that
Williams was a "psychopath" or "sociopath" on the day of
the killings and at least some of them thought this condition a
52. His "rap sheet" is summarized in Williams v. United States, 250 F.2d 19, 21 n.3
(D.C. Cir. 1957).
53. Id
54. Id at 26.
55. In re Williams, 157 F. Supp. 871, 872 n.l (D.D.C. 1958).
56. Id at 875.
57. Id at 872 n.1.
58. Williams v. District of Columbia, 147 A.2d 773, 776 (1959).
59. Williams v. United States, 312 F.2d 862, 863 (D.C. Cir. 1962).
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"mental disease." Without any evidence relating the abnor-
mality to the offenses, this was enough to raise the issue and
require the Government to disprove the claim that the crimes
were the product of mental disease or defect beyond a reason-
able doubt. We conclude, however, that although the defend-
ant's evidence relating to insanity was sufficient to make the
issue, it was not so strong, when considered with the evidence
offered by the Government, as to require a directed verdict of
acquittal by reason thereof.6 0
Although Williams is occasionally cited for its dictum that "[a] long
criminal record does not excuse crime,"6 the case certainly does not
stand for the proposition that sociopathy does not qualify as mental
disease under the McDonald definition. On the contrary, the case held
that such a diagnosis presents an issue that can only be resolved by the
jury.6
2
Thus, despite McDonald, the Durham rule left the legal status of
the sociopath in the hands of the psychiatrist. The only change McDon-
ald required is that the psychiatrist be willing to testify that sociopathy
"substantially affects mental or emotional processes and substantially
impairs behavior controls. 63 Certainly, if a psychiatrist is willing to
testify that a crime was the "product" of the defendant's sociopathic
personality, as the doctors at St. Elizabeth's Hospital decided they
could do in 1957 (and two of them did, in the Williams case), it could
certainly be concluded that sociopathy meets the McDonald definition
of mental disease. It must be remembered, however, that the psychiat-
ric staff at St. Elizabeth's Hospital, under Superintendent Winfred
Overholser, followed Dr. Cleckley's conception of the sociopath.'
Most were not followers of the "social history" school. On at least one
occasion, where a psychologist at St. Elizabeth's Hospital testified that
a defendant was a sociopath solely on the basis of a battery of psycho-
logical tests, the trial judge's exclusion of his testimony -as "con-
clusory" was upheld by the court of appeals.65
60. Id at 865.
61. E.g., United States v. Brawner, 471 F.2d 969, 993 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
62. 312 F.2d at 867.
63. Id. at 851.
64. See note 23 supra.
65. United States v. Alexander, 471 F.2d 923, 967-68 (D.C. Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 409
U.S. 1044 (1973). The testimony is reproduced and analyzed in Judge Bazelon's dissenting
opinion. 471 F.2d at 952-57 (Bazelon, J., dissenting).
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V. THE SOCIOPATH UNDER THE ALI TEST
In view of the controversy the "sociopath" had already engen-
dered, it is hardly surprising that the ALI proceeded gingerly in draft-
ing the Model Penal Code sections defining the defense of insanity. In
the fourth tentative draft issued in 1956, criminal responsibility was
defined in terms of a lack of "substantial capacity either to appreciate
the [wrongfulness] of his conduct or to conform his conduct to the re-
quirements of law"66 as a result of mental disease or defect. The Model
Penal Code offered no definition of the terms "mental disease or de-
fect," however, on the grounds that their definition was "not feasi-
ble."'67 As to one category of "mental disease," however, unfeasibility
was no obstacle: the "sociopath" or "psychopath" was to be excluded.
Section 4.01(2), known as the "caveat" clause, provided that "[t]he
terms 'mental disease or defect' do not include an abnormality mani-
fested only by repeated criminal or otherwise anti-social conduct. '68
The comment to this section makes it clear what "abnormality" the
drafters had in mind:
Paragraph (2) of section 4.01 is designed to exclude from the
concept of "mental disease or defect" the case of so-called
"psychopathic personality." The reason for the exclusion is
that, as the Royal Commission put it, psychopathy "is a sta-
tistical abnormality; that is to say, the psychopath differs from
a normal person only quantitatively or in degree, not qualita-
tively; and the diagnosis of psychopathic personality does not
carry with it any explanation of the causes of the abnormal-
ity." While it may not be feasible to formulate a definition of
"disease", there is much to be said for excluding a condition
that is manifested only by the behavior phenomena that must,
by hypothesis, be the result of disease for irresponsibility to be
established. Although British psychiatrists have agreed, on
the whole, that psychopathy should not be called "disease",
there is considerable difference of opinion on the point in the
United States. Yet it does not seem useful to contemplate the
litigation of what is essentially a matter of terminology; nor is
it right to have the legal result rest upon the resolution of a
dispute of this kind.69
Although this comment speaks broadly of completely excluding
66. MODEL PENAL CODE § 4.01(1) (Tent. Draft No. 4, 1956).
67. Id, Comment.
68. Id. § 4.01(2), Comment.
69. Id
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the "psychopathic personality," it is clear that this term is being used
only in the sense that the "social history" school would use it; i.e., the
diagnosis assumes a mental disorder on the basis of a long history of
antisocial conduct. Nevertheless, this ambiguity has resulted in a
checkered history for the "caveat" clause. While most of the federal
courts and all of the state courts adopting the ALI test of insanity have
included section 4.01(2), they do not read it as an exclusion of all diag-
noses of "psychopath" or "sociopath" from the definition of mental dis-
ease.
United States v. Currens,70 the first federal case to adopt the ALI
test, involved a defendant who was diagnosed as a "sociopathic person-
ality." Yet in holding that the jury should have been instructed accord-
ing to the ALI test, the court "agree[d] fully" with the "caveat"
clause.71 Noting that the term "psychopath" means different things to
different psychiatrists, Judge Biggs concluded that it would be unfair to
make availability of the insanity defense hinge on the vagaries of a
diagnostic label.72 If the diagnosis is based merely on a pattern of re-
current criminal behavior, he agreed that "it does not describe a disor-
der which can be considered insanity."73 On the other hand, he noted
that the psychiatric evidence of Currens' condition went far beyond re-
current criminal behavior:
A reasonable jury could infer that Currens is mentally incapa-
ble of ordered social living; that he is subject to hysterical epi-
sodes, that under stress he has many symptoms of the
incapacitating disease of schizophrenia; and that he is gener-
ally subject to depression, fright, and losses of contact with
reality. On the basis of such evidence we believe that a jury
reasonably could find that he did not possess the necessary
guilty mind when he committed the crime of which he is ac-
cused.74
Similarly, in adopting the "caveat" clause, the Second Circuit stressed
the limited nature of its exclusion. Only cases where repeated criminal-
ity is the sole basis of finding a mental disorder are excluded, thus leav-
ing room for cases where evidence of mental disease augments mere
recidivism.7S
70. 290 F.2d 751 (3d Cir. 1961).
71. Id at 774 n.32.
72. Id. at 761-62.
73. Id at 761.
74. Id at 763.
75. United States v. Freeman, 357 F.2d 606, 625 (2d Cir. 1966).
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The two courts which have rejected the "caveat" clause have done
so on a false premise. Citing the same two leading exponents of the
"psychodynamic" school76 who criticized the psychiatric soundness of
section 4.01(2), the two courts assumed that there is no such thing as an
abnormality manifested only by repeated criminal or otherwise antiso-
cial conduct. This assumption ignored the fact that not all psychiatrists
conceive of the "sociopathic personality" in the same manner as Dr.
Overholser and Dr. Diamond. There are clearly many psychiatrists,
and DSM-III suggests that they are in the majority, who subscribe to
the "social history" school. By rejecting the "caveat" clause, these two
courts may have left the door open for a DSM-III diagnosis of "antiso-
cial personality disorder."
Another criticism of the "caveat" clause is more troublesome. In
United States v. Wade," the Ninth Circuit expressed great concern that
it would be "confusing and ambiguous to jurors."7 Yet, nothing in the
Model Penal Code suggests that section 4.01(2) was ever intended as an
instruction to jurors. If the only evidence of mental disease presented
by a defendant is a diagnosis supported by "repeated criminal or other-
wise anti-social conduct," then the issue of insanity should not even be
submitted to the jury. Thus seen, the "caveat" clause operates as a rule
of evidence rather than a jury instruction. This was the position ulti-
mately taken by the United States Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia in United States v. Brawner.79 In rejecting the Durham
formula in favor of the ALI test, the court retained its McDonald defi-
nition of mental disease, concluding that this already provided an ade-
quate guard against an insanity defense based only upon diagnosis
from a long criminal record."0 The "caveat" paragraph was still
adopted "as a rule for application by the judge, to avoid miscarriage of
justice, but not for inclusion in instructions to the jury."' I The rule is
easily satisfied, however, as noted by the court in its following state-
ment:
[T]he introduction or proffer of past criminal and anti-social
actions is not admissible as evidence of mental disease unless
accompanied by expert testimony, supported by a showing of
76. Wade v. United States, 426 F.2d 64, 72 (9th Cir. 1970); United States v. Smith, 404
F.2d 720, 727 n.8 (6th Cir. 1968). Both Wade and Smih relied upon Diamond, supra note 1,
at 193-94, and Overholser, supra note 26, at 530.
77. 426 F.2d 64 (9th Cir. 1970).
78. Id at 73.
79. 471 F.2d 969 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
80. Id at 993.
81. Id at 994.
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the concordance of a responsible segment of professional
opinion, that the particular characteristics of these actions
constitute convincing evidence of an underlying mental dis-
ease that substantially impairs behavioral controls."2
This would apparently allow a "social history" diagnosis such as the
one DSM-III allows, as long as it is accompanied by an opinion that
the assumed mental disorder "substantially impairs behavior controls."
In other words, labels are permissible, but only if those sanctioned by
the court are used. This aspect of the Brawner approach was subse-
quently criticized and rejected by the District of Columbia Court of
Appeals in Bethea v. United States83 on three grounds: (1) the refer-
ences to a concordance of "a responsible segment of professional opin-
ion" and "convincing" evidence were inherently ambiguous and
variable; (2) courts lack competence to make such judgments; and (3)
cross-examination could be relied upon to expose the flaws in the ex-
perts' opinion and diagnosis.84
All of these objections to the "caveat" clause are easily overcome if
the clause is directly applied as an evidentiary rule without en-
shrouding it in the McDonald cloud of ink. The admissibility of a psy-
chiatric opinion that the defendant was suffering from a mental disease
should not depend upon a separate showing in each individual case
that the opinion reflects a "concordance." On the other hand, courts
cannot relieve themselves of their responsibility to determine whether a
particular mental condition meets the threshhold legal prerequisite of
being a "mental disease." The "caveat" clause should be read for what
it is: a flat rejection of the "social history" school's approach to diag-
nosing the sociopath. To put it bluntly, if all that the psychiatrist could
tell us is that the defendant meets all the diagnostic criteria of DSM-I1
and therefore, in his opinion the defendant's behavior controls must
have been substantially impaired, the psychiatrist should be told to
take his little yellow book and go home. His opinion should not be
admissible, and if admitted, should be deemed insufficient to either
shift the burden of proof to the prosecution or require instructing the
jury on the issue of insanity. On the other hand, if the psychiatrist
describes the underlying mental processes of the defendant and ex-
plains how those processes result in antisocial behavior, the "caveat"
clause should be deemed inapplicable because the jury would only be
confused by it.
82. Id
83. 365 A.2d 64 (1976), cert. denied, 433 U.S. 911 (1977).
84. Id at 80 n.36.
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Whether a condition is a "mental disease" or not would then be
treated as a legal question, used to determine the admissibility and suf-
ficiency of evidence. The ultimate determination of whether this condi-
tion renders the defendant not responsible for his actions is still left to
the jury. The difficulty with the approach used in Brawner is that the
jury is called upon to make this determination twice. First, the jury is
asked to decide if the defendant's sociopathic condition is a mental dis-
ease, applying the McDonald test of whether it substantially impairs
behavior controls. Assuming the jury answers that question affirma-
tively, the jury is then asked whether the defendant should be held
responsible by applying the ALI test of whether the defendant "lacks
substantial capacity either to appreciate the [wrongfulness] of his con-
duct or to conform his conduct to the requirements of law."'85 It makes
more sense to have the first question answered by the court before de-
ciding whether the second question should even be submitted to the
jury. The "caveat" paragraph could serve that purpose well, unencum-
bered by the McDonald definition.
VI. PREVALENCE
One issue that cannot be ignored in assessing whether the soci-
opath should be included in the legal definition of "mental disease" is
the prevalence of sociopaths in our criminal population. The prospect
of turning loose thousands of habitual criminals and immunizing them
from punishment is hardly appealing. This argument has been turned
around to suggest that acquitting sociopaths on the ground of insanity
will allow keeping them locked up even longer under the present laws
which automatically commit those acquitted on grounds of insanity for
an indeterminate period of treatment.86 It is not a very convincing re-
buttal, though. First, not all jurisdictions allow indeterminate confine-
ment of those acquitted by reason of insanity. California, for example,
now limits such confinement to the maximum term for the underlying
offense.87 Secondly, there is no assurance that the psychiatrists who
assess the defendant's sanity and dangerousness once he is committed
will be applying the same standards used by the psychiatrists who testi-
fied at trial. The reality of this risk is strikingly apparent in Williams v.
United States.8 Finally, there is no assurance that any "treatment"
85. MODEL PENAL CODE § 4.01(1) (Tent. Draft No. 4, 1956).
86. Donaldson v. O'Connor, 493 F.2d 507, 522 & n.22 (5th Cir. 1974); Wade v. United
States, 426 F.2d 64, 72 (9th Cir. 1970); Overholser, supra note 26, at 531.
87. In re Moye, 22 Cal. 3d 457, 584 P.2d 1097, 149 Cal. Rptr. 49 (1978).
88. 312 F.2d 862 (D.C. Cir. 1962). See text accompanying notes 51-62 supra. In People
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can be offered to a sociopath. Indeterminate commitment without any
treatment raises serious constitutional issues.89 Many experts have con-
cluded that there simply is no effective way known to modern psychia-
try to change the personality of a sociopath.9" While Dr. Diamond's
prediction that a biochemical test for sociopathy would be devised
within ten years has proven to be slightly optimistic,9 1 there is little
dispute about the accuracy of his second prediction "that it will be ten
times ten years or even much longer, before the discovery of any con-
sistently effective, thoroughly reliable method of psychiatric treatment
for these sick individuals who now plague society with their behavioral
disorders.
'92
A very pragmatic question arises as to how many criminals would
qualify if the DSM-III criteria for antisocial personality disorder were
treated as a "mental disease." Two precautionary observations, how-
ever, are in order. First, the number will obviously be much smaller if
the diagnosis is limited the way psychiatrists of the "psychodynamic",
school limit it. Secondly, mere diagnosis as a sociopath would not re-
quire acquittal, even under the ALI test without the "caveat" clause.
The jury would still have to find that, as a result of his sociopathic
personality, the defendant lacked substantial capacity to appreciate the
criminality or wrongfulness of his conduct or to conform his conduct to
the requirements of the law. Even under the DSM-III definition, it has
been predicted that "the uncomplicated kind and degree of mental im-
pairment in Personality Disorders, as a generalization, will hardly ever,
if ever, satisfy the required high level of mental impairment that public
policy imposes upon the criminal defendant before he will be excused
from criminal responsibility." 93 It is important to note, however, that
the psychiatrist making this prediction subscribes to the "psychody-
namic" school.94
DSM-III itself estimates that the prevalence of antisocial personal-
ity disorder for American men is about 3%, and for American women is
less than 1%. Higher prevalence is suggested in "lower class popula-
v. Martin, 114 Cal. App. 3d 739, 746, 170 Cal. Rptr. 840, 843 (4th Dist. 1981), the court noted
that a sociopath falls into none of the categories for which civil commitment is available
under the Lanterman-Petris-Short Act, CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 5150 (West 1972 &
Supp. 1981).
89. See Donaldson v. O'Connor, 493 F.2d 507, 522 (5th Cir. 1974).
90. See Blocker v. United States, 288 F.2d 853, 861 n.12 (D.C. Cir. 1961).
91. Diamond, supra note 1, at 198.
92. Id at 199.
93. Pollack, supra note 9, at 61.
94. Id at 60.
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tions." 95 These estimates are consistent with Robins' study, from which
the DSM-III criteria were apparently drawn.96 Among the control
group drawn from the general population, 2% were diagnosed with
sociopathic personality. But of the 500 patients who had been referred
to the psychiatric clinic as children, 22% were diagnosed as soci-
opathsY7 Of greater relevance, however, would be the prevalence
among those who are charged with crime, especially those who are
charged on a recurring basis.
Such an assessment would require a major research effort. A re-
search project that was recently completed by the Rand Corporation
offers some insight. 98 Extensive social histories of forty-nine career
criminals, all serving at least their second prison terms, and all con-
victed of armed robbery in California, were collected and compiled.
Not all of the diagnostic criteria of DSM-III were addressed, but
among those that were, some interesting findings emerged:
A. All, of course, were over the age of 18.
B. Their history as youngsters revealed:
(1) 48% were occasional truants, and 5% were habitual
truants from school.9"
(2) 75% committed their first serious crime before age
15, and 90% before age 18. The mean age for their first
arrest was 15.100
(3) 24% reported the influence of alcohol or drugs as
contributory factors in their juvenile criminal career. 101
(4) The crimes most commonly committed as juveniles
were auto theft (48%), burglary (30%) and theft over $50
(13.5%). 102
(5) While the "initiator" was not assessed, 71% partici-
pated in more than three fights as juveniles, and another
16% participated in one or two. 103
C. Since the age of 18:
(1) 10% had an "antiemployment" history, and another
95. DSM-III, supra note 3, at 319.
96. See ROBINS, supra note 21, at 82.
97. DSM-III, supra note 3, at 319.
98. J. PETERSILIA, P. GREENWOOD & M. LAVIN, CRIMINAL CAREERS OF HABITUAL
FELONS (1978).
99. Id at 74.
100. Id at 74-75.
101. Id at 76 table 47.
102. Id at 75.
103. Id at 95 table 64.
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30-40% had poor employment performance."°
(2) All had multiple arrests and convictions. The aver-
age respondent committed 20 crimes per year of street
time. 1
0 5
(3) 63% engaged in fights as young adults, and 45% dur-
ing their adult period."°
(4) In the sample as a whole, crime "planning" was
weak, with a high proportion of their criminal activity
being done impulsively on the spur of the moment. 107
Thus, even though most of the DSM-III criteria were not addressed, a
very high proportion would meet the minimum criteria for diagnosis as
antisocial personality disorder. This should not surprise anyone. Ask
any police officer, prosecutor, public defender, or judge how many of
those charged in criminal cases every day would meet the diagnostic
criteria outlined in DSM-III.
VII. CONCLUSION
In releasing the third edition of the Diagnostic and Statistical Man-
ual, the American Psychiatric Association cautioned that "[t]he use of
this manual for non-clinical purposes, such as determination of legal
responsibility, competency or insanity, or justification for third-party
payment, must be critically examined in each instance within the ap-
propriate institutional context."' 8 This article has critically examined
the criteria for antisocial personality disorder, and found them inap-
propriate for inclusion in the legal definition of "mental disease," as
that term is used in the prevailing tests of insanity employed in crimi-
nal cases. We must insist upon more than the "social history" diagno-
sis which DSM-III allows before the issue of sanity is even presented to
a jury. This goal can be readily accomplished in those jurisdictions
which follow the ALI test of insanity by utilizing the "caveat" clause of
section 4.01(2) as a rule of evidence, to exclude expert opinions based
on nothing more than the defendant's social history.
104. Id at 87.
105. Id at vii.
106. Id at 95 table 64.
107. Id at 60.
108. DSM-III, supra note 3, at 12.
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